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Criminal Law/Constitutional Law-THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
DILEMMA IN FLORIDA-Bernie v. State, 524 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1988)
DOUGLAS UNDERWOOD
T HE WAR on drugs in recent years has brought tough choices for
Florida's electorate and judiciary. One such choice made by vot-
ers was the 1982 amendment to article I, section 12 of the Florida
Constitution, which requires that Florida's constitutional protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures be interpreted as the
United States Supreme Court interprets the fourth amendment to the
United States Constitution.1 Since 1982, the Supreme Court has ruled
that in certain instances courts should apply a "good faith exception"
to the judicially created exclusionary rule, which requires the exclu-
sion of evidence obtained in violation of the defendant's fourth
amendment rights. 2 The Court allows evidence to be admitted under
the "good faith exception" when a police officer, executing an invalid
search warrant, acts in good faith.3 Under Florida's 1982 constitu-
tional amendment, the "good faith exception" to the exclusionary
rule is now the law in Florida.4
The purpose of this Note is to examine the Florida Supreme Court's
recent treatment of the exclusionary rule and "good faith exception"
in Bernie v. State in light of the 1982 amendment to the Florida Con-
stitution. This Note will analyze the Bernie decision and argue that the
Supreme Court of Florida erred when it affirmed the lower court's
decision on grounds other than the "good faith exception" and also
1. Prior to the 1982 amendment, the Supreme Court of Florida had held that the Florida
Constitution provided greater search and seizure protection than that provided by the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution. State v. Sarmiento, 397 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1981)
(holding that the electronic eavesdropping of a conversation between a suspected drug seller and
a consenting informant required an "intercept warrant" under article I, section 12 of the Florida
Constitution even though federal case law interpreted the United States Constitution as not re-
quiring a warrant in such instances).
2. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-24 (1984).
3. Id.
4. See Howard v. State, 483 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (discussed infra note 119);
Sims v. State, 483 So. 2d 81, 82-83 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (citing Leon's "good faith exception"
but refusing to apply exception because affidavit authorizing search was facially invalid); Rand
v. State, 484 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (applying Leon analysis to determine if officer
acted with "objective reasonable reliance" upon the search warrant); Albo v. State, 477 So. 2d
1071 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (holding Leon inapplicable when police rely on inaccurate information
from other police sources).
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when it failed to address the "good faith exception" in light of an
applicable Florida statute. Further this Note will suggest that the su-
preme court examine the "good faith exception" as applied by the
Second District Court of Appeal in State v. Bernie,' and query
whether the United States Supreme Court's rulings on the "good faith
exception" should be applied to admit evidence from searches invali-
dated by Florida statute. Finally, the Note will recommend that article
I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution be amended to allow Florida
courts greater discretion in interpreting the search and seizure protec-
tions provided by both the Florida Constitution and Florida statutes.
I. FACTS AND BACKGROUND: THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE
On October 13, 1983, a package addressed to Vickie Bernie of Sara-
sota, Florida broke open at the Emery Air Freight facility in Tampa,
Florida.6 The envelope, shipped from Dayton, Ohio, was marked "ur-
gent . . . deliver immediately." ' 7 After determining the package con-
tained a suspicious powder-like substance, Emery officials contacted a
drug enforcement agent who tested the substance and identified it as
cocaine.8 The agent then contacted the Sarasota County Sheriff's Of-
fice. Meanwhile, Vickie's husband, Dr. Bruce Bernie, visited the Em-
ery office in Tampa to check on the package, whereupon Emery
officials advised him that the package would be delivered to his resi-
dence on the following day.9
On the morning of October 14, 1983, Detective Steven Matosky re-
quested that a circuit judge issue a search warrant to authorize a
search of the Bernies' residence pursuant to the controlled delivery of
the package of cocaine.' 0 The circuit judge issued the warrant based
upon Matosky's affidavit swearing that the Bernies were expecting the
package to be delivered to their residence and that the cocaine would
be located inside the Bernies' residence following the delivery. A few
5. 472 So. 2d 1243, 1244 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), aff'd, 524 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1988).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. A "controlled delivery" occurs when an officer maintains "dominion and control"
over the previously searched package to ensure that the contents do not change after the initial
search. Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 768 (1983).
11. State v. Bernie, 472 So. 2d 1243, 1245 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), aff'd, 524 So. 2d 988 (Fla.
1988). The affidavit recited in part:
That based upon your Affiant's experience as a law enforcement officer, and narcotics
detective, and further upon the events described above, your Affiant believes that
BRUCE and VICKIE BERNIE are in fact expecting this package to be delivered at
their residence (apartment) at #608 C, 5770 Midnight Pass Road, Sarasota, Florida.
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minutes after the controlled delivery was made, law enforcement offi-
cers knocked and announced their presence and purpose. Mrs. Bernie
opened the door, allowing the officers to enter, and Detective Ma-
tosky approached Dr. Bernie in the bathroom area. After reading the
search warrant to the Bernies, the officers conducted a full search of
the apartment, discovering a hollow pen body with cocaine residue
inside, a knife and small mirror, cocaine residue on the rim of the
toilet, and the Emery package. 12
The Bernies were arrested and charged with possession of cocaine in
violation of section 893.13, Florida Statutes. 3 The defendants moved
to suppress the evidence, contending that the state seized the cocaine
as a result of an unreasonable search and seizure. They argued that a
Florida statute and Florida case law prohibited the circuit judge from
issuing the warrant to search the Bernies' home when the judge had
no reason to believe that narcotics laws were being violated within the
residence at the time the warrant was issued. 4 The Bernies relied on
section 933.18, Florida Statutes, which provides in part:
No search warrant shall issue under this chapter or under any other
law of this state to search any private dwelling occupied as such
unless:
(5) The law relating to narcotics or drug abuse is being violated
therein;
No warrant shall be issued for the search of any private dwelling
under any of the conditions hereinabove mentioned except on sworn
proof by affidavit of some creditable witness that he has reason to
believe that one of said conditions exists which affidavit shall set
forth the facts on which such reason for belief is based.' 5
The Bernies also relied upon Gerardi v. State,' 6 which held that sec-
tion 933.18 requires that a violation of narcotics laws be occurring
Your Affiant was advised that the package would be delivered to the residence on the
afternoon of October 14, 1983. Your Affiant therefore believes that the suspect co-
caine will be inside the residence of #608 C, Midnight Pass Road, Sarasota, Florida
with the full knowledge of BRUCE and VICKIE BERNIE.
Id. (emphasis added by Fla. 2d DCA).
12. Id.
13. FLA. STAT. § 893.13 (1983). Section 893.13(1)(a), Florida Statutes, states in relevant
part: "Except as authorized by this chapter and chapter 499, it is unlawful for any person to sell,
manufacture, or deliver, or possess with intent to sell, purchase, manufacture, or deliver, a con-
trolled substance."
14. State v. Bernie, 472 So. 2d at 1245.
15. FLA. STAT. § 933.18 (1983), quoted in State v. Bernie, 472 So. 2d at 1245 (emphasis
supplied by court).
16. 307 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).
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within the private dwelling at the time a magistrate issues the war-
rant. 7 The trial judge "reluctantly" obeyed Gerardi and section
933.18 and granted the Bernies' motion to suppress. I"
On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeal reversed the trial
court and held that the illegally seized evidence was admissible,' 9
grounding its holding on two authorities. The first authority cited by
the court was the 1982 constitutional amendment. Florida voters, the
court noted, thereby amended the Florida Constitution to provide that
the search and seizure protection guaranteed by the Florida Constitu-
tion be construed to conform with the United States Supreme Court
decisions interpreting the fourth amendment to the United States Con-
stitution.20 The italicized portions represent changes in the text of arti-
cle I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution as amended in 1982:
Searches and seizures.-The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures, and against the unreasonable interception of private
communications by any means, shall not be violated. No warrant
shall be issued except upon probable cause, supported by affidavit,
particularly describing the place or places to be searched, the person
or persons, thing or things to be seized, the communication to be
intercepted, and the nature of evidence to be obtained. This right
shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the
United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court. Articles or information obtained in violation of this
right shall not be admissible in evidence if such articles or
information would be inadmissible under decisions of the United
States Supreme Court construing the 4th Amendment to the United
States Constitution.2'
The district court stated that after the amendment's effective date of
January 4, 1983, Florida courts were required to follow the United
17. Id. at 854-55. in Gerardi, a magistrate issued a warrant to search Gerardi's home after a
package mailed to Gerardi's address was found to contain hashish. The magistrate issued the
warrant before the package was delivered to the Gerardi's address. Before executing the warrant,
the deputy sheriff telephoned the judge and confirmed the defendant's receipt of the package.
Although the Fourth District Court of Appeal noted that this procedure was acceptable in other
jurisdictions, it held that section 933.18, Florida Statutes, (1971), prohibited such a procedure in
Florida. Gerardi, 307 So.2d at 855.
18. State v. Bernie, 472 So. 2d 1243, 1245 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), aff'd, 524 So. 2d 988 (Fla.
1988).
19. Id. at 1246-47 (relying on United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) and the amended
language of article I, section 12 of the Florida Constiwtion).
20. Id.
21. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
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States Supreme Court rulings concerning admissibility of evidence un-
der the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution.2 2 The
district court also relied on the United States Supreme Court holding
in United States v. Leon,23 where a judge issued a search warrant au-
thorizing a search of defendant Leon's house after a confidential in-
formant of unproven reliability contacted the police. 24 Drugs were
found in the house and Leon filed a motion to suppress the evidence,
contending that the magistrate issued the warrant without the requisite
probable cause. 25 The district court granted the motion, which the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 26 The United States Su-
preme Court reversed, stating that the exclusionary rule operates as a
"'judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment
rights generally through its deterrent effect.' 2 7
The Court noted that the exclusionary rule was created to act as a
safeguard against improper searches by "law enforcement officers en-
gaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." ' 2 In
Leon, the police acted in good faith both in presenting to the magis-
trate an affidavit outlining the confidential informant's tips and in
awaiting the search warrant. Finding probable cause in the affidavit,
the magistrate issued the search warrant. 29 Although the district court
later determined that no probable cause existed,30 the United States
Supreme Court allowed the contraband into evidence, stating that rea-
22. See Comment, United States v. Leon and Illinois v. Gates: A Call For State Courts To
Develop State Constitutional Law, 2 U. ILL. L. REv. 311 (1987). Of the fifty state constitutions
containing search and seizure provisions, only the Florida Constitution explicitly conforms to the
Supreme Court's construction of the fourth amendment. Article I, section 13 of the California
Constitution provides essentially the same language as the fourth amendment to the United
States Constitution. However, article I, section 28(d) of the California Constitution, known as
the "truth-in-evidence" provision, requires that "relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any
criminal proceeding." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d).
It follows that while evidence in violation of federal law may be excluded under the federal
exclusionary rule, "relevant evidence" shall always be admitted, even if it is in violation of
California law. California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1631 (1988) (holding that "the people
of California could permissibly conclude that the benefits of excluding relevant evidence of crim-
inal activity do not outweigh the costs when the police conduct at issue does not violate federal
law.") Thus, like Florida, the California Constitution was amended to provide that search and
seizure protection in California would extend only as far as does the federal exclusionary rule
protection.
23. State v. Bernie, 472 So. 2d 1243, 1247 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (citing United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)), aff'd, 524 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1988).
24. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 902 (1984).
25. Id. at 903.
26. United States v. Leon, 701 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
27. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
28. Id. at 914 (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977)).
29. Id. at 902.
30. Id. at 903.
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sonable judicial minds would differ as to the existence of probable
cause in a particular affidavit. 3' The Court determined that the exclu-
sionary rule cannot have any deterrent effect when an officer acts in
the objectively reasonable belief that his or her conduct is in accord-
ance with the protection of the fourth amendment.3 2
The Court concluded that a cost-benefit analysis must be applied in
determining whether to admit evidence seized in violation of a defend-
ant's fourth amendment rights." When courts apply the exclusionary
rule to exclude evidence, they should determine whether the likelihood
of deterring police misconduct is sufficient to justify the loss of valua-
ble evidence in the case.34 Leon thus created the "good faith excep-
tion" to the exclusionary rule, which allows evidence seized in
violation of the defendant's fourth amendment rights to be admissible
when the executing officer acted with an objectively reasonable belief
that no fundamental rights had been violated."
The district court in Bernie relied upon Leon to hold that although
the dispatched search warrant violated section 933.18, Florida Stat-
utes, the evidence was admissible because the police officer acted with
"objective good faith" pursuant to the "facially valid warrant" au-
thorizing the search of the Bernies' apartment.3 6 The district court
noted that although neither the officer nor the judge obeyed section
933.18 in issuing the warrant before the narcotics were located within
the residence, the officer fully complied with section 933.09, Florida
Statutes, by announcing his authority and purpose before entering the
Bernies' apartment 7 The district court determined that the "good
faith exception" to the exclusionary rule applied because the officer's
conduct was "objectively reasonable" 38 and the "benefits, if any, pro-
duced by suppressing the cocaine . . . cannot outweigh the substantial
societal cost of excluding the cocaine from evidence. ' 39 The district
court reversed the trial court and ruled that the evidence was admissi-
ble. 40
31. Id. at 914.
32. Id. at 918-19.
33. Id. at 922.
34. State v Bernie, 472 So. 2d 1243, 1247 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (construing United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), aff'd, 524 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1988)).
35. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-24.
36. State v. Bernie, 472 So. 2d at 1247-48.
37. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 933.09 (1983).
38. State v. Bernie, 472 So. 2d at 1247-48.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1248.
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II. BERNIE V. STATE: THE SUPREME COURT OPINION
On January 7, 1988, the Supreme Court of Florida approved the-
judgment of the district court 4' in a two-part majority opin-
ion.42 In part I, the court asserted that the 1982 amendment to article
I, section 12, of the Florida Constitution mandated that Florida's con-
stitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
comport with the United States Supreme Court rulings construing the
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. The court found
that the language of article I, section 12, "clearly indicates an inten-
tion to apply to all United States Supreme Court decisions regardless
of when they are rendered." ' 43 The court stated that even though the
electors in 1982 "could not have foreseen nor ratified" the prospec-
tive decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the electors voted
to bind Florida to the Court's future decisions. 44
In part II of Bernie, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the
search warrant was valid in light of recent case law upholding such an
"anticipatory search, ' 45 which the court defined as a search 'based
upon an affidavit showing probable cause that at some future time,
but not presently, certain contraband will be at the location set forth
in the warrant." ' 46 After finding that neither the Florida Constitution
nor the United States Constitution prohibits anticipatory searches,
47
the court adopted language requiring only a substantial probability
that the evidence be on the premises at the time of the search.
4 1
41. Bernie v. State, 524 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1988).
42. The two-part opinion acquired a 5-2 majority in the following configuration:
McDonald, C.J., Shaw, J., and Ben C. Willis (Ret.), Associate Justice, formed the majority
opinion.
Ehrlich, J., concurred with parts I and II with an opinion in which McDonald, C.J., and
Shaw, J., concurred.
Overton, J., concurred in judgment but dissented to part I.
Kogan, J., concurred with part I and dissented to part II.
Barkett, J., dissented to part I and part II.
Id. at 992-93.
43. Id. at 990-91.
44. Id. at 991.
45. Id. at 991-92.
46. Id. (citing 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.7(c) (2d ed. 1978)).
47. Id. at 991.
48. Id. (quoting People v. Glen, 30 N.Y.2d 252, 282 N.E.2d 614, 331 N.Y.S.2d 656 (1972)).
Glen allowed the search warrant to be issued while the contraband was en route to the defend-
ant's home stating that such an anticipatory search was permissible in the absence of any state
statute requiring that defendant have a "present possession of the seizable property." 30 N.Y.2d
at 260, 282 N.E.2d at 618, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 662. The language in Glen indicates that the New
York court anticipated statutes such as section 933.18, Florida Statutes. The Bernie court also
cited United States v. Hendricks, 743 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1006 (1985)
as a related authority.
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The majority in Bernie relied on Illinois v. Andreas,49 which estab-
lished that recipients of a package, properly searched, no longer en-
joyed any expectation of privacy in that packagei 0 In Andreas, after a
search at the United States border revealed contraband within a con-
tainer, police officers reopened the container" and arranged its con-
trolled delivery to the addressee. The Andreas Court held that the
addressee had no expectation of privacy in the container after the ini-
tial search 5 2 and that any gap in surveillance created an insufficiently
significant possibility that the contents of the package had been
changed.53
Finally, the court in Bernie held that section 933.18, Florida Stat-
utes 54 which prohibits the issuance of a warrant to search a private
dwelling unless narcotics laws are being violated therein, did not pre-
vent the issuance of a search warrant in this case. 5 The court deter-
mined that a "reasonable construction" of the words in the statute
would allow a warrant to be issued when evidence and supporting af-
fidavits show drugs have already been legally discovered in transit to
the private dwelling.56 Ruling that the warrant was valid, the court did
not address the applicability of the "good faith exception" to the ex-
clusionary rule."
A. The Prospective Constitutional Amendment
When the Supreme Court of Florida decided five to two 58 to apply
the 1982 amendment to the Florida Constitution 59 to all prospective
United States Supreme Court decisions regarding the fourth amend-
ment, 60 it overturned a longstanding rule in Florida. Before the 1982
constitutional amendment, under article I, section 12, the courts of
Florida were free to provide Florida's citizens with higher standards
of protection against governmental intrusion than provided by the
49. 463 U.S. 765 (1983).
50. Id. at 771.
51. Id. at 766.
52. Id. at 771.
53. Id. at 773.
54. See supra text accompanying note 15.
55. Bernie v. State, 524 So. 2d 988, 992 (Fla. 1988).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See supra note 42.
59. For a thorough discussion of the 1982 amendment to article I, section 12 of the Florida
Constitution, see Slobogin, State Adoption of Federal Law: Exploring the Limits of Florida's
"Forced Linkage" Amendment, 39 U. FiA. L. REv. 653 (1987).
60. See Bernie v. State, 524 So. 2d 988, 991 (1988).
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fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. 61 In Bernie v.
State ,62 however, the court refused to accept the Bernies' argument
that the rights of Floridians under Florida's state constitution could
never be limited by future United States Supreme Court opinions. 6 As
Justice Ehrlich stated in his concurrence, "[n]owhere in either article
I, section 12 or the statement placed on the November ballot is there
any indication that the amendment was intended to encompass only
those United States Supreme Court decisions existing at the time of
adoption.'" ' The ballot statement read:
Constitutional Amendment
Article I, section 12
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-Proposing an amendment to the
State Constitution to provide that the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be construed in conformity
with the 4th Amendment to the United States constitution and to
provide that illegally seized articles or information are inadmissible if
decisions of the United States Supreme Court make such evidence
inadmissible. 65
Justice Ehrlich concluded that it would be an affront to the voters of
Florida for the court to hold that article I, section 12, does not apply
to future decisions rendered by the United States Supreme Court.6
In his concurring opinion, Justice Overton argued against applying
all future United States Supreme Court decisions to the 1982 amend-
ment.67 Justice Overton wrote that the amendment simply requires the
court to interpret the Florida constitutional provision in accordance
with Supreme Court decisions existing at the time of the amendment. 61
The justice reasoned that a constitution is a written document "totally
superior to the operations of government" and as such, a constitution
should not be amended by future decisions of the United States Su-
preme Court. 69 Balking at the idea that the application of the Florida
Constitution should depend upon the "whims" of the United States
61. See, e.g., State v. Lavazzoli, 434 So. 2d 321, 323 (Fla. 1983).
62. 524 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1988).
63. Id. at 990-91.
64. Id. at 993.
65. Bernie, 524 So. 2d at 993 (Ehrlich, J., concurring) (quoting FLA. H.R. JouR. 4 (Spec.
Sess. June 21, 1982) (emphasis added by the Supreme Court of Florida)).
66. Id. at 994 (Ehrlich, J., concurring).
67. Id. (Overton, J., concurring in judgment).
68. Id.
69. Id.
1989]
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Supreme Court, he called such an application "contrary to the mean-
ing and purpose of a constitution." 70
Another argument against the prospective application of Supreme
Court decisions to the Florida Constitution is discussed in Freimuth v.
State,7 where the Supreme Court of Florida prohibited the Legislature
from defining a hallucinogenic drug in accordance with a federal stat-
ute enacted after the effective date of the Florida statute. The Frei-
muth decision held that to do so was an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power. 7 Bernie differs from Freimuth in that in Bernie the
voters of Florida, not the Legislature, delegated to the United States
Supreme Court the power to construe the Florida Constitution. How-
ever, the principle seems clear that new laws should be controlled by
the current electorate, not by broad delegations of power to a "gov-
ernmental entity outside the state and not responsible to the citizens of
the state.' 73
The Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement which
accompanied the House Joint Resolution proposing the amendment
expressed the legislators' intent that the amendment be applied pro-
spectively. 74 However, this intent was not translated to the actual
wording of the ballot-the ballot contained no specific language indi-
cating its prospective application. 75 Consequently, it is unclear
whether the voters interpreted the ballot summary to mean that they
were approving all future United States Supreme Court decisions re-
garding the fourth amendment as part of the Florida Constitution.
Additionally, if the amendment was intended to provide Floridians
the identical search and seizure protection which the fourth amend-
ment provides, the voters might have simply repealed article I, section
70. Id. Justice Overton reasoned that Floridians clearly intended to reduce the scope of the
exclusionary rule in 1982, but, under the majority's prospective application of Supreme Court
decisions, if the Supreme Court decided to expand the exclusionary rule's scope, Florida would
be bound by this decision. Justice Overton did not address the fact that should the Supreme
Court expand rights under the fourth amendment, the states would be required to protect these
rights.
71. 272 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1972).
72. Id. at 476. Justice Drew concurred, stating that courts have "uniformly and without
deviation" held that any attempt by the Legislature or any other lawmaking branch of govern-
ment to incorporate into law future regulations or laws is an unconstitutional delegation of
power. Id. at 477.
73. Bernie v. State, 524 So. 2d 988, 995 (Fla. 1988) (Overton, J., concurring in judgment).
74. See Staff of Fla. S. Comm. on Judiciary-Crim., HJR 31-H (1982) Staff Analysis 10
(final June 29, 1982) (on file with committee). The staff analysis specifically states that although
it is unlikely that the United States Supreme Court will adopt a "good faith exception" to the
exclusionary rule, if it did adopt the exception, Florida courts must follow suit under the pro-
posed amendment. Id.
75. See supra text accompanying note 65.
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12.716 One reason that a proposal to repeal article I, section 12 was not
made in 1982 could be that the repeal of Florida's independent consti-
tutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures would
have created more controversy and more opposition than the amend-
ment. However, the effect on the rights of Floridians is the same.
The wording of the 1982 amendment suggests that the Legislature
intended to substantially limit search and seizure protection in Flor-
ida. The amending language states that evidence seized in violation of
one's constitutional rights 'shall not be admissible in evidence if such
articles or information would be inadmissible under decisions of the
United States Supreme Court . . . . 77 The added (italicized) lan-
guage does not state that evidence deemed admissible by the Supreme
Court would be admissible in Florida. Rather, the amendment states
that evidence inadmissible under Supreme Court decisions would simi-
larly be inadmissible in Florida. The phraseology permits a different
interpretation. The distinction lies in the recent trend of Supreme
Court rulings favoring admission of evidence under certain situations
with few determinations that evidence is inadmissible .7  This trend
provides a more limited search and seizure protection.
In the future, because the federal exclusionary rule is judicially
created 79 and may be judicially eliminated, the 1982 amendment could
abrogate Florida's constitutional search and seizure rights. If the
United States Supreme Court abolishes the exclusionary rule, under
the language of the 1982 amendment Florida courts similarly might
eliminate the state exclusionary rule. The words "illegally seized arti-
cles or information are inadmissible if decisions of the United States
Supreme Court make such evidence inadmissible" 0 indicate that
should the Supreme Court abrogate the rule and allow evidence to be
admitted, then evidence will not be "inadmissible" under article I,
section 12, and will be similarly admitted in Florida.
Arguably, the amendment was never intended to abrogate Florida's
constitutional right in the event that the Supreme Court rescinds the
76. See Bernie, 524 So. 2d at 1000 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
77. State v. Bernie, 472 So. 2d 1243, 1246 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (quoting FLA. CONST. art. I,
sec. 12) (emphasis in court opinion), aff'd, 524 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1988).
78. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Shepard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984) (holding evidence seized pur-
suant to a warrant subsequently invalidated because of a technical error on the part of the issu-
ing judge admissible); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (holding evidence that would have
inevitably been discovered despite police misconduct admissible); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968) (holding evidence seized by a police officer in the belief that an individual is armed and
dangerous admissible).
79. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984).
80. Bernie v. State, 524 So. 2d 988, 993 (quoting FLA. H.R. JouR. 4 (Spec. Sess. June 21,
1982)) (emphasis supplied by the Supreme Court of Florida).
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federal rule. A countervailing argument is that under article I, section
12, Florida's exclusionary rule would continue to exist even if the Su-
preme' Court abrogated the federal exclusionary rule, but would not
operate to exclude any evidence so long as the Supreme Court finds
the evidence not "inadmissible." At least one writer has argued that
the amendment would effectively repeal Florida's independent consti-
tutional search and seizure protections and that Florida politicians in-
tentionally misled voters calling the amendment a "reform" of
Florida's search and seizure protections. 8'
At least one Florida judge has objected to the 1982 amendment and
called for another referendum to strike the language approved in the
1982 amendment. 2 Judge Hugh Glickstein of the Fourth District
Court of Appeal believes that by succumbing to their fear of crime,
Floridians forfeited their ability to interpret their own state constitu-
tion. Glickstein asserts that Floridians would be wiser to entrust their
personal freedoms to the state judiciary, rather than to the United
States Supreme Court.83
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Florida stated in Bernie v.
State8 that the voters of Florida had spoken. The 1982 amendment to
article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution, the court noted, man-
dates that Florida's search and seizure protections shall conform with
all past and future United States Supreme Court decisions construing
the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution.8 5
81. See Castillo, Voters May Forfeit Rights by Approving Measure, Tallahassee Democrat,
Oct. 24, 1982, at BI, col. 1.
82. See Bizzaro, It's Time to Reclaim Forfeited Rights, Judge Says, Fla. Bar News, Aug.
15, 1987, at 10, col. 2.
83. Id.
84. 524 So. 2d 988, 992 (1988).
85. Id. Interestingly, a related constitutional question has recently been addressed by the
Supreme Court of Florida. See Welker v. State, 504 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), quashed in
part, aff'd in part, rem'd in part, 536 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 1988). In Welker, a defendant was
convicted of the unlawful sale and possession of cocaine. The First District Court of Appeal
refused to hold that the 1982 amendment to article I, section 12 overturned existing Florida case
law. Id. at 806-07. The district court reversed and remanded on the grounds that the confidential
informant who tape recorded a conversation between himself and the defendant failed to testify
as to his consent to the tape recording as required by Tollett v. State, 272 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1973).
Tollett rejected the holding in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), holding that a confi-
dential informant must testify as to his or her consent to inform, even though White held that
such testimony was unnecessary to show consent. Tollett construed section 934.03(2)(c), Florida
Statutes (1971), to require the informant's testimony of consent. In Welker, the district court
declined to overrule Tollett and certified the following question of great public importance to the
Supreme Court of Florida:
HAS THE REQUIREMENT, ENUNCIATED IN TOLLETT V. STATE, 272 SO. 2d
490 (FLA. 1973), THAT CONSENT TO THE TAPING OF A CONVERSATION
MUST BE ESTABLISHED BY THE TESTIMONY OF THE PERSON WHO CON-
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B. Validity of the Search Warrant
In part II of the Bernie opinion, the supreme court concluded that
the search itself was legal. Regarding the constitutionality of an "an-
ticipatory search,' '86 the court cited United States ex. rel. Beal v.
Skaff,87 a seventh circuit case holding that a search warrant could be
issued in futuro pursuant to an affidavit alleging that contraband
would be located at a certain place some time in the future.88 The Ber-
nie court stated that the "law is clear that such warrants are not con-
stitutionally invalid for lack of a present violation of law at the
premises where the contraband will be delivered in the future." 8 9 The
court's own emphasis of the word "constitutionally" might lead one
to expect the court to discuss section 933.18, Florida Statutes,"O which
required that narcotics laws be violated within the dwelling before a
search warrant could be issued and imposed a statutory prohibition
upon anticipatory searches, despite the absence of a constitutional
prohibition upon anticipatory searches in Florida.
Before addressing section 933.18, the court focused on Illinois v.
Andreas,9' where the United States Supreme Court announced that the
threshold question was "whether an individual has a legitimate expec-
tation of privacy in the contents of a previously lawfully searched con-
tainer." 92 The Andreas Court answered in the negative, stating that
"[n]o protected privacy interest remains in contraband in a container
once government officers lawfully have opened that container and
identified its contents as illegal." 93 The Supreme Court of Florida
found that the factual circumstances in Bernie and in Andreas were
similar. 94 The court thus concluded that "the law is now clear that
SENTED, BEEN SUPERCEDED BY THE 1982 AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE I,
§ 12, OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION AND UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS CONSTRUING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION?
Welker, 536 So. 2d at 1018. The Supreme Court of Florida quashed the district court ruling that
tape recordings were inadmissible without testimony of the informant. Id. at 1020.
86. Bernie v. State, 524 So. 2d 988, 991 (Fla. 1988).
87. 418 F.2d 430, 434 (7th Cir. 1969) (upholding the constitutionality of anticipatory
searches).
88. Id.
89. Bernie, 524 So. 2d at 991 (emphasis in original); see, e.g., United States v. Hendricks,
743 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1006 (1985) (where customs officials inter-
cepted box full of cocaine and procured a search warrant, leading to court's determination that
no probable cause existed, but that Leon's "good faith exception" applied and evidence was
admissible).
90. See supra text accompanying note 15.
91. 463 U.S. 765 (1983).
92. Id. at 771.
93. Id.
94. Bernie v. State, 524 So. 2d 988, 992 (Fla. 1988).
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neither the Florida Constitution nor the United States Constitution re-
quires issuance of a warrant for this type of search." 9
Similarities between the facts in Andreas and the facts in Bernie are
not obvious. Andreas involved a warrantless search of a container,
outside the defendant's home, after the container had already been
lawfully searched. In addition, the police officers never entered the
defendant's home. 96 Bernie, on the other hand, involved the validity
of a search warrant authorizing the search of the defendant's home
after a container of drugs, sent to the home, was legally searched
while in transit. Andreas involved an exigent situation. The police of-
ficer was in the process of securing a search warrant when the defend-
ant attempted to leave his apartment building with the contraband. 97
Nothing in Bernie suggests that exigency prevented the officers from
securing a search warrant after the narcotics were located in the dwell-
ing, as required by Florida statute. 98
It is difficult to see how the Bernie majority concluded that the
"law is clear" that no warrant is needed." As stated by Justice Kogan
in his dissent, even if the Bernies had no expectation of privacy in the
package of cocaine on the basis of Andreas, undoubtedly the Bernies
continued to have an expectation of privacy in their home. As Justice
Kogan further pointed out, whereas in Andreas police officers
searched a previously searched package outside the defendant's home,
in Bernie police officers entered the Bernies' home with a warrant in
violation of a state statute. 100 It cannot be argued that Andreas per-
mits entrance into a private residence without a warrant or with an
invalid warrant. In addition, it is untenable to translate the lack of
expectation of privacy in a previously opened container of contraband
to a lack of expectation of privacy in one's home when a container of
contraband is in transit to that home.
1. Statutory Criteria
Following its discussion of Andreas, the court addressed the appli-
cation of section 933.18, Florida Statutes, to the facts of Bernie. The
court did not apply section 933.18, but noted that the drugs were in
the "constructive possession" of the law enforcement officers because
of the search and seizure of the cocaine after the package broke
95. Id.
96. Andreas, 463 U.S. at 767.
97. Id.
98. Bernie, 524 So. 2d at 998.
99. Id. at 992.
100. Id. at 998 (Kogan, J., concurring and dissenting).
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open. 10 1 The majority found that a "reasonable construction" of sec-
tion 933.18 indicated that the Florida Legislature did not intend to
prohibit the search of the Bernies' apartment under these circum-
stances. 102 The court found that section 933.18, explicitly prohibiting
the issuance of a search warrant unless narcotics laws are being vio-
lated within the private dwelling, did not apply to situations where the
"state already knows the drug laws have been violated."'1 3 The court
concluded that because the statute did not apply the warrant was
valid, and it was, therefore, unnecessary to apply United States v.
Leon. 104
In its effort to conform to United States Supreme Court rulings, the
court virtually ignored a Florida statute which directly addresses the
issuance of search warrants in situations such as that in Bernie. As the
court observed, section 933.18 requires that: "No search warrant shall
issue under this chapter ... to search any private dwelling ... unless
... [t]he law relating to narcotics or drug abuse is being violated
therein."05 The language of the statute is neither limited nor ambigu-
ous. It logically follows from such language that an affiant seeking a
search warrant must show probable cause that a narcotics law is being
violated within the dwelling at the time the warrant is issued. No evi-
dence exists that the Legislature intended section 933.18 to be inter-
preted as requiring that the affiant seeking a warrant show probable
cause that a law relating to narcotics is about to be violated or that a
law relating to narcotics will be violated in the near future. If the Leg-
islature had intended such a construction, it would have so indi-
cated. 106
The court also appeared to ignore Gerardi v. State,0 7 which held
that warrants to search private dwellings, issued before the narcotics
violation occurred within the private dwelling, are in violation of Flor-
ida statutory law. I08 The cases relying upon Gerardi affirm such an
adherence to Florida law.' 9 As noted in Justice Kogan's dissent in
101. Id. at 992.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. (quoting section 933.18, Florida Statutes) (emphasis supplied by court).
106. See, e.g., Carson v. Miller, 370 So. 2d 10, 11 (Fla. 1979) (stating that the court has
"consistently held that unambiguous statutory language must be accorded its plain meaning")
(citing Thayer v. State, 335 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1976)); McDonald v. Roland, 65 So. 2d 12 (Fla.
1953); A.R. Douglas, Inc. v. McRainey, 102 Fla. 1141, 137 So. 157 (1931); Van Pelt v. Hilliard,
75 Fla. 792, 78 So. 693 (1918).
107. 307 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).
108. Id. at 855.
109. See, e.g., State v. Powers, 388 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (requiring that there
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Bernie, "every appellate court that has addressed the issue of the de-
gree of complience (sic) with search and seizure statutes required, has
consistently held that such complience (sic) must be absolute.""' 0 The
court in Bernie failed to apply section 933.18, Florida Statutes, and
also failed to overturn Gerardi, which theretofore had required appli-
cation of the statute.
A troubling aspect of Bernie v. State is that the court, in its effort
to conform to the United States Supreme Court rulings on the fourth
amendment, conveniently sidestepped a pertinent Florida statute by
applying an arguably similar United States Supreme Court case and
construing the Florida statute as inapplicable to the circumstances at
bar."' It appears to follow that Florida courts can now search the opi-
nions of the United States Supreme Court in search of "similar"
cases, and apply these to Florida cases by virtue of the 1982 amend-
ment to article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution. If there exists
a Florida statute affording greater search and seizure protection than
that required by the United States Supreme Court, then the Florida
courts may construe the statute as inapplicable to the particular facts
before the court. This possibility may provide Florida prosecutors a
greater opportunity to convict the accused. Before Bernie, prosecutors
applied Florida case law interpreting the Florida Constitution and
Florida statutes." 2 Following Bernie, prosecutors may apply United
States Supreme Court rulings to circumvent the laws of Florida.
exist probable cause that contraband is located within the private dwelling before a magistrate
may issue a warrant to search the dwelling) (citing Gerardi v. State, 307 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1975)).
110. Bernie v. State, 524 So. 2d 988, 998 n.2 (Fla. 1988) (citing Gildrie v. State, 94 Fla. 134,
113 So. 704 (1927); Jackson v. State, 87 Fla. 262, 99 So. 548 (1924); State v. Bernie, 472 So. 2d
1243 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); State v. Tolmie, 421 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Hurt v. State,
388 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), pet. for rev. denied, 399 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 1982); Hesselrode
v. State, 369 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 381 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 1980); Leveson v.
State, 138 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)).
111. Id. at 992.
112. The exclusionary rule, judicially created in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914),
existed in Florida long before the United States Supreme Court imposed it upon the states in
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In Gildrie v. State, 94 Fla. 135, 113 So. 704 (Fla. 1927), the
Supreme Court of Florida relied upon interpretations of the fourth and fifth amendments to the
United States Constitution to construe the Florida Constitution to require the exclusion of evi-
dence obtained by the unlawful search of a dwelling. In 1968, an explicit exclusionary rule was
written into the Florida Constitution, which read: "Articles or information obtained in violation
of this right shall not be admissible in evidence." FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (1968). During the
1966 Constitution Revision Commission debates, Justice B.K. Roberts, one of the chief propo-
nents of the exclusionary rule, stated:
It's my personal view that if we should recede from the exclusionary rule, we take out
the only weapon that the citizen has to enforce his rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The exclusionary rule should not continue to hang in this state
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It seems unlikely that such a result is what the voters of Florida
intended. Because the 1982 amendment to article I, section 12 was not
intended to restrict the Legislature's ability to provide additional
rights for Floridians against unreasonable searches and seizures, it
should be construed to define only the constitutional limits of searches
and seizures in Florida. Florida statutes regulating search and seizure
procedures act independently of the Florida Constitution when stat-
utes impose greater protection against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures." 3 To interpret the Florida Constitution any other way might
lead to the conclusion that any statute providing greater search and
seizure protection than the United States Supreme Court provides vio-
lates the amended article I, section 12 and is, therefore, unconstitu-
tional. In 1982, Florida's voters removed the supreme court's ability
to interpret the state constitutional search and seizure guarantees;
however, they did not limit the Legislature's power to provide greater
search and seizure protection than the Constitution requires.
2. Constitutional Criteria
In accordance with the Florida constitutional requirement that Flor-
ida courts apply United States Supreme Court rulings, the Second Dis-
trict Court of Appeal applied Leon's "good faith exception" in State
v. Bernie.14 The district court held that although the warrant was is-
sued in violation of Florida law, the officers acted in "objectively rea-
sonable reliance" on the warrant." 5 The court stated:
[W]e conclude that under the cost-benefit approach of Leon,
exclusion of the cocaine would be improper because "there is no
police illegality and thus nothing to deter." Indeed, Deputy Matosky
did everything that was asked of him and acted with objective good
faith; he conducted an independent investigation, submitted all
information to the circuit judge for a probable cause determination,
and obtained a facially valid warrant authorizing a search of the
Bernies' residence." 6
The district court also stated that it is the magistrate's responsibility to
establish probable cause and that an officer cannot be expected to
on the slender thread of case law. It should be written into the Constitution of this
state, the organic law.
Staff of Fla. S. Comm. on Judiciary-Crim., HJR 31-H (1982) Staff Analysis 2 (final version of
June 29, 1982) (on file with committee).
113. Bernie. 524 So. 2d at 999 (Kogan, J., concurring and dissenting).
114. 472 So. 2d 1243, 1248 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), aff'd, 524 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1988).
115. Id. at 1247 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921 (1984)).
116. Id. (citation omitted).
1989]
194 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITYLA WREVIEW [Vol. 17:177
scrutinize a magistrate's determination that there is probable cause or
that a search warrant is technically correct."17 The court concluded
that where an affidavit is "so fundamentally defective" that no Flor-
ida law enforcement officer could reasonably rely upon it, the "good
faith exception" to the exclusionary rule does not apply. "8
The Second District Court of Appeal misapplied Leon's "good
faith exception" in State v. Bernie."9 The United States Supreme
Court held in Leon that where police officers act in good faith reli-
ance on a warrant they have no reason to believe to be invalid, the
deterrent value of excluding the evidence is nominal while the cost of
excluding the evidence is great.12 0 Although nothing in Leon indicates
that the police officer should have known probable cause was lacking,
the police officer in Bernie should have known he was acting pursuant
to a warrant in direct violation of section 933.18, Florida Statutes. 12'
As the Leon opinion states, the standard of reasonableness is an ob-
jective standard, which "requires officers to have a reasonable knowl-
edge of what the law prohibits.' 1 22
The law in Florida prohibits search warrants issued in violation of
section 933.18.123 The court in Bernie should have used the same test
as used in Leon: "whether a reasonably well-trained officer would
have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate's author-
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1248.
119. See, e.g., Howard v. State, 483 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). In Howard, the court
cited to the Second District Court of Appeal in State v. Bernie, 472 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2d DCA
1985), aff'd, 524 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1988), but refused to apply the "good faith exception" to
evidence obtained pursuant to an invalid warrant. Howard, 483 So. 2d at 846. The search war-
rant in Howard described marijuana plants growing outside the defendant's home but did not
allege any plants to be located within the home. Id. at 845-46. Consequently, the court found a
"fundamental defect in the warrant" and refused to apply the "good faith exception" because
the warrant was in violation of section 933.18, Florida Statutes (1983), which required that there
be probable cause that the contraband be located within the private dwelling before a warrant
could be issued. Id. at 847. The court found that the "executing officers cannot be said to have
acted in 'objectively reasonable reliance' upon the warrant." The court granted the motion to
suppress the evidence. Id.
120. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 992 (1984).
121. This section, of course, explicitly requires that a narcotics violation be occurring within
the dwelling to be searched at the time the warrant is issued. See FLA. STAT. § 933.18.
122. Leon, 468 U.S. at 920 n.20.
123. See Gildrie v. State, 94 Fla. 134, 113 So. 704 (1927). In Gildrie, the court reversed the
appellant's conviction on the grounds that the warrant to search the appellant's house was inva-
lid for failure to specify the items to be seized within the dwelling. The court stated that the
statute authorizing the search warrant should be strictly construed because "there is no process
known to the law the execution of which is more distressing to the citizen or that actuates such
intense feeling of resentment on account of its humiliating and degrading consequences." Id. at
139, 113 So. at 705.
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ization.' '1 24 Were the test otherwise, a police officer would be encour-
aged to remain ignorant of state law in order to qualify for the "good
faith exception." As stated by Justice Kogan's dissent: "I believe that
the importance of police officers understanding the clearly delineated
laws they are enforcing cannot be understated. To charge police offi-
cers with knowledge of statutory search and seizure law gives police
the incentive to educate themselves."'S2 Although the officer in Bernie
did not rely upon an insufficient probable cause determination, as in
Leon, it is surely beyond the scope and intention of Leon to apply the
"good faith exception" to instances where officers violate explicit
state statutes.
Despite the importance of the "good faith exception," the Supreme
Court of Florida failed to address it. The court affirmed the holding
in Bernie v. State, but found that section 933.18, Florida Statutes, did
not apply to search warrants where "the state already knows the drug
laws have been violated. ' 126 As stated above, the court's statutory
construction is questionable, as the statute mentions no circumstances
under which a warrant may be issued for the search of a dwelling
prior to the narcotics laws' being violated therein. 127 The Supreme
Court of Florida concluded its opinion by stating that the officers'
"constructive possession" of the package added to the officers' cer-
tainty that it contained contraband, which removed it from the scope
of the statute. 128
If the Florida Legislature had merely been concerned whether the
existence of probable cause must be shown before a magistrate issues
a warrant, it could have specifically indicated such. The Legislature
might have crafted section 933.18 to contain an exception to the re-
quirement that narcotics laws are "being violated therein" before a
dwelling can be searched in instances when law enforcement officers
are in "constructive possession" of a package known to contain con-
traband. If the Legislature was dissatisfied with the result in Gerardi
v. State,2 9 it could have amended the statute. The Legislature did not
create this exception to section 933.18, Florida Statutes; the Supreme
Court of Florida did.
III. CONCLUSION
In a 1986 article Justice William Brennan stated that we live in an
age where "federal preservation of civil liberties is a minimum, which
124. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23.
125. Bernie v. State, 524 So. 2d 988, 996 (Fla. 1988) (Kogan, J., concurring and dissenting).
126. Id. at 992.
127. See FLA. STAT. § 933.18 (1983).
128. Bernie, 524 So. 2d at 992.
129. 307 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).
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the states may surpass" to preserve the personal freedoms of their citi-
zens.' 30 Justice Brennan cited several examples where states have re-
sponded to the United States Supreme Court by requiring greater
protections under their respective state constitutions.' Justice Bren-
nan also lauded the 250 state court opinions over the past fifteen years
which have held that Supreme Court constitutional minimums were
insufficient to satisfy more stringent state constitutions. 3 2 He called
for liberals and conservatives alike to greet with enthusiasm "[tihis
rebirth in state constitutional law." 33
In 1982, the voters of Florida chose not to embrace enthusiastically
their state constitutional protections. Instead, they declined to allow
Florida's courts to continue interpreting Florida's constitutional pro-
visions regarding searches and seizures and delegated that authority to
the United States Supreme Court. The voters of Florida should recon-
sider this decision and should amend article I, section 12 of the Flor-
ida Constitution to allow Florida courts the opportunity to interpret
the Florida Constitution as providing more constitutional protection
than the United States Supreme Court interprets the fourth amend-
ment as providing. The Florida Constitution serves the people of Flor-
ida, and accordingly should be interpreted by Florida's courts
observing the minimum guarantees of the United States Constitution.
The Supreme Court of Florida improvidently affirmed the holding
of the district court that Leon's "good faith exception" included in-
stances where a police officer acted pursuant to a search warrant in
direct violation of a state statute. The court should have addressed the
holding of the district court on its merits, so that magistrates, law en-
forcement officers, and the citizens of Florida would know whether
section 933.18, Florida Statutes, is to be followed. By holding that the
Legislature did not intend to prohibit searches such as that in Bernie,
the court sidestepped the issue of strict statutory adherence. The stat-
130. Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as
Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535, 548 (1986).
131. Id. (comparing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), which held that in-
ventory search of car impounded for a parking violation was permissible under the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution, with State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D.
1976), which held on remand that the same inventory search was impermissible under the South
Dakota Constitution).
132. Id. (citing Western Pa. Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins.
Co., 515 A.2d 1331 (Pa. 1986); Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, Inc. 388 Mass. 83, 445 N.E.2d
590 (1983); Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d 108
(1981); Robins v. Pruneyard, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd, 447
U.S. 74 (1980); People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975);
State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 52 P.2d 51 (1974)).
133. Id. at 550.
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ute, taken on its face, clearly applies to this case as it purports to
apply to all narcotics searches of private dwellings. Had the Legisla-
ture intended otherwise, it would have so stated.
The Supreme Court of Florida should not have applied Illinois v.
Andreas, 3 4 for the decision in Andreas allows only the warrantless re-
opening of a container of contraband outside a private dwelling, pro-
vided the container was previously opened pursuant to a lawful
search. Andreas did not authorize the warrantless search of a private
dwelling after a package en route to that dwelling broke open in tran-
sit and was lawfully searched.
The Supreme Court of Florida does not serve the citizens of this
state well when it relies upon the 1982 amendment to article I, section
12 of the Florida Constitution to apply a remotely similar case in an
effort to circumvent an explicit Florida statute. The court should have
decided Bernie on the basis of section 933.18, Florida Statutes, and
not on the basis of Andreas. For now, the citizens of Florida must
wait to see which other Florida statutes fall by the wayside in the
court's effort to conform to the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States.
134. 463 U.S. 765 (1983).
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